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I. INTRODUCTION 
As government agencies and law enforcement departments increasingly adopt 
big-data surveillance technologies as part of their routine investigatory practice, 
personal information privacy concerns are becoming progressively more palpable.  
On the other hand, advancing technologies and data-mining potentially offer law 
enforcement greater ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute criminal activity.  
These concerns (for personal information privacy and the efficacy of law 
enforcement) are both very important in contemporary society.  On one view, 
American privacy law has not kept up with advancing technological capabilities, 
and government agencies have arguably begun to overstep the acceptable 
boundaries of information access, violating the privacy of their citizens and 
decreasing the relevancy of the Fourth Amendment.  On another, crime has 
decreased significantly over the past few decades,1 thanks in part to more effective 
and efficient policing,2 and criminal activity has become more technologically 
advanced as well; to unduly limit police would hamper legitimate efforts to keep 
our communities safe from serious crime.   
Despite decades of increasingly safer streets and fewer instances of serious 
police-citizen violence in America,3 the police continue to hold a highly criticized 
role in society.4  Indeed, most recent press about police use of big data technologies 
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 1. Although for a challenge to this general claim, arguing that the reality is a bit more complex.  
See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2013). 
 2. See generally, Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Surveillance for Crime Prevention in 
Public Space: Results and Policy Choices in Britain and America, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 497 
(2006) (providing evidence that visual CCTV surveillance and improved lighting in urban areas reduce 
certain types of crime). 
 3. See Daniel B. Wood, US Crime Rate at Lowest Point in Decades. Why America Is Safer Now., 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0109/US-crime-
rate-at-lowest-point-in-decades.-Why-America-is-safer-now; David Seifman, 20 Years of Safer Streets, 
N.Y. POST (May 11, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/05/11/20-years-of-safer-streets; see also 
Principles of Good Policing: Avoiding Violence Between Police and Citizens, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CMTY. 
REL. SERV., http://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfinal092003.pdf (last 
revised Sept. 2003) 
 4. For an earlier discussion of this phenomenon, see Egon Bittner, The Functions of Police in 
Modern Society, in ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 89-102 (1990). 
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has focused on the negative implications that these developments have on citizen 
privacy—which is a very important concern5—but less attention has been given to 
balancing these privacy interests with the important societal interest in promoting 
effective and efficient police work.  The tensions between these competing, equally 
legitimate aims is substantial and, in the context of police use of automated license 
plate recognition (ALPR) systems, limiting the scope of law enforcement data 
retention to protect citizen privacy (one option that has begun to find traction in 
Canada and in some U.S. states) might also protect the privacy of the police 
officers using these systems, as disclosure of these databases to the public under 
freedom of information (FOI) laws can allow citizens to track the historical 
policing patterns of individual officers.   
Significant tensions exist between protecting citizen privacy and promoting 
open access to government surveillance information as a form of liberty-preserving 
citizen oversight; that is, if we protect privacy at all costs, we may risk limiting our 
democratic ability to oversee some government action and thus increase the 
potential for arbitrary government domination at direct cost to our freedom.  Herein 
lies the second troubling conflict: limiting ALPR data retention not only protects 
the privacy of innocent individuals whose plates happen to be scanned, but it also 
limits the ability of the public to oversee police work, as a form of reciprocal 
surveillance, because the records available under FOI laws would be much more 
limited.  Thus, the interests behind FOI laws, including the implicated First 
Amendment rights to gather information about government conduct, and personal 
privacy rights are in direct tension, in addition to the more obvious conflict 
between privacy and security. 
As mentioned above, despite the obvious threats to personal information 
privacy posed by the increased adoption and use of sophisticated ALPR 
technologies by law enforcement, FOI laws in some jurisdictions have also been 
allowing citizens to access information about policing patterns and the historical 
movement patterns of law enforcement officers utilizing ALPR systems.  In 
essence, these government agencies have been releasing their ALPR databases, 
including un-redacted license plate numbers, to members of the public through 
public disclosure requests.  These databases may contain not only the license plate 
information of each vehicle scanned by the system, but also identifying information 
about the patrol vehicle that facilitated the scan, including precise date, time, and 
geo-location information of each scan, allowing citizens to track the patrol patterns 
of police vehicles outfitted with ALPR cameras.  Thus, in a very real sense, the 
surveillance technologies used by the government have become a tool for citizen-
counter-surveillance and a mechanism for oversight.   
It should also be noted that this type of willing disclosure by law enforcement 
                                                                                                     
 5. For other work in this vein by the same author, see Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive 
Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 9 I/S: J. L. & 
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y. (forthcoming 2014), manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2339338; 
Bryce Clayton Newell & Joseph T. Tennis, Me, My Metadata, and the NSA: Privacy and Government 
Metadata Surveillance Programs, in ICONFERENCE 2014 PROCEEDINGS 345-55 (2014), available at 
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/47299/109_ready.pdf?sequence=2; Bryce Clayton 
Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 17 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 12, 32 (2011). 
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indicates either 1) a strong commitment to a high level of departmental 
transparency, which ought to be applauded; and/or 2) simply an absence (for 
whatever reason) of any relevant state public records exception that might be used 
to deny these disclosure requests.  In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the public disclosure 
in 2012 of an ALPR database and the subsequent publication of the location of all 
41 scans of the Mayor’s license plate contained in the data6 resulted in a temporary 
data classification that exempts ALPR data from public disclosure in that state until 
August 1, 2015 or until the Minnesota Legislature acts on the issue, whichever 
occurs first.7  The American Civil Liberties Union applauded the temporary 
classification.8  But, in some significant ways, this classification alone, without 
other measures to ensure public oversight of the ALPR system’s use, is unfortunate 
and should not necessarily be endorsed.   
In Seattle, Washington, the situation has not taken this same unfortunate turn, 
at least at present, although the Seattle situation presents its own problems.  The 
Seattle Police Department (SPD) has been releasing ALPR databases to the public 
for some time and, based on prior events involving conflicts in Seattle between 
privacy and public disclosure, there are at least two reasons9 to suggest that the 
SPD’s continuing disclosures are motivated by an interest in transparency.  
However, the SPD practices are not without their own faults and, incidentally, such 
faults are generally shared by most other police departments around the country.  
Part II of this paper explores some of the privacy-related ramifications of 
publicly accessible geo-spatial databases by relying on some recent controversies 
surrounding the publication of publicly accessible geo-spatial data.  In Part III, the 
paper analyzes recent social and legal developments in the United States related to 
ALPR use by local law enforcement.  The recent Canadian experience in British 
Columbia, which resulted in the provincial Information and Privacy Commissioner 
demanding changes to data retention and information-sharing practices of the 
Victoria Police Department (VPD) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) provides some interesting comparative points of reference.  Part IV 
presents an overview of Fourth Amendment privacy and the concept of privacy in 
public and questions the proper role of ALPR systems in police practice against the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution.   
Part V consists of initial findings from an exploratory empirical analysis of 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Catherine Crump, You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers are Being Used to 
Record Americans’ Movements, ACLU, July 2013, at 3, available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf; Eric Roper, City Cameras Track 
Anyone, Even Minneapolis Mayor Rybak, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/166494646.html; Eric Roper, Police Cameras Quietly 
Capture License Plates, Collect Data, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/165680946.html. 
 7. See generally, Crump, supra note 6; Current Temporary Classifications, MINN. DEP’T OF 
ADMIN., INFO. & ANALYSIS DIV., http://www.ipad.state.mn.us/docs/tccurrent.html (last visited Jan. 18, 
2014). 
 8. See generally Crump, supra note 6. 
 9. These include 1) prior use of state privacy law to defend withholding dash-camera footage 
under state public disclosure law to protect bystander privacy (without any similar attempt in the case of 
ALPR data), and 2) a renewed SPD 20/20 transparency program.  See SPD 20/20 – A Vision for the 
Future, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/spd2020 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
2014] LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BIG DATA 401 
two databases of ALPR data received under state FOI law from the SPD amounting 
to approximately over 1.7 million ALPR scans10 over a roughly three-month period 
(the “SPD Databases”).  In Part VI, the paper examines the efficacy of FOI laws 
that provide public access to these databases that contain a great deal of personally 
identifiable information, and the proper role of public access in establishing a form 
of reciprocal surveillance intended to promote responsible citizen oversight and 
preserve individual freedom.  
Finally, in conclusion, the paper provides a normative argument for the right of 
privacy in personal information in public spaces, balanced against the important 
societal interest in government transparency and open access to government 
information.  This normative theory attempts to account for and differentiate 
between the different roles of citizens and public officials carrying out their official 
duties, and their respective rights to privacy in public spaces.  This normative 
argument provides a prescription for ALPR data privacy practices while still 
ensuring a certain level of public access to government information. 
II. PUBLIC OUTRAGE OVER PUBLIC ACCESS 
A number of recent developments highlight the building tensions between FOI 
or access to information (ATI) laws and the personal privacy interests of individual 
members of the public.  As government agencies increasingly collect, use, sell, 
share, and archive personal information for various purposes (whether to protect 
national security interests, facilitate more efficient policing, or administer 
government programs), the informational privacy rights of individuals are 
potentially threatened when this personal information is publicly accessible under 
local or national FOI or ATI laws.  This apparent tension pits two ideals directly 
against each other.  Open access to government information serves as an important 
check on government power and abuse; one used by journalists and others for very 
legitimate reasons.  Privacy rights in personal information also provide some check 
on government overreaching, as demonstrated by the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure and by the line of decisional 
privacy decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court following 
Griswold v. Connecticut.11  In some instances, these tensions have been highlighted 
by the online mapping of publicly accessible geo-spatial information, and these 
developments have spurred both legal change and public outrage. 
A. The New York Gun Map 
In response to the tragic shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, 
Connecticut in December 2012, a suburban New York state newspaper filed public 
records requests for the personal information of all pistol permit holders within 
three nearby counties.  Subsequently, the paper generated and published an 
interactive online map that included the names and addresses of each of the 
                                                                                                     
 10. The data includes data from two separate databases, each connected to a different ALPR system 
in use by the SPD during the relevant timeframe.  The two databases contain a total of 1,779,266 rows 
of license plate scans (at one row per scan) (not excluding certain rows generated by the systems for 
other purposes).  
 11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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individuals who had pistol permits in two of these counties (Rockland and 
Westchester).12  The newspaper received the gun permit information through public 
records requests, and the data was released as publicly accessible information under 
state FOI law.  Needless to say, the map—sourced from publicly available 
information—caused quite a controversy.  In response, the New York legislature 
quickly passed the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act 
(“NY SAFE Act”), which amended the state Penal Law to allow gun owners to 
request that their permit applications become exempt from public disclosure.13 
Following the enactment of the NY SAFE Act, the newspaper took its map 
offline.14  The amended state Penal Law also had some slightly counter-intuitive 
ramifications.  Prior to enactment, pistol permit holders’ personal information had 
been shielded from disclosure to commercial entities seeking to use the information 
for marketing purposes, but not to the broader public.  After the NY SAFE Act 
came into force, however, this personal information was no longer shielded unless 
the individual permit holders file the appropriate form seeking an exemption.15  
Thus, marketing companies now gain greater access to this personal information, 
unless individual gun owners take affirmative steps to protect their privacy. 
B. Proposition 8 Donor Map 
While information about donations to political campaigns or ballot initiatives 
can serve a valuable purpose, releasing this information publicly may also lead to 
harassment and disincentivize political donations from citizens who are concerned 
about being publicly associated with a sensitive political position.  This scenario 
was played out clearly when personal information of donors to the campaign for 
California’s Proposition 8 in 2008, which would have prohibited same-sex 
marriages in California, was overlaid onto Google Maps, thus allowing a visual, 
map-based, searchable database of Proposition 8 supporters.16  As a consequence, 
supporters were targeted by death threats, scare tactics, and boycotts of supporter-
owned businesses.17  California access law made names, zip codes, employer 
information, and donation amounts public.  While exact addresses and contact 
information were not included in the released data, this information could easily be 
determined using simple web-based services. 
                                                                                                     
 12. See, e.g., Julie Moos, Newspaper Publishes Names, Addresses of Gun Owners, POYNTER.ORG, 
http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/mediawire/199148/newspaper-publishes-names-addresses-of-gun-
owners (last updated Jan. 7, 2013). 
 13. See Public Records Exemption - FOIL Form FAQ, N.Y. DIV. OF ST. POLICE, 
http://www.troopers.ny.gov/Firearms/Public_Records_Exemption (last visited Jan 18, 2014). 
 14. See Andrew Khouri, N.Y. Newspaper Removes Online Map of Gun-permit Holders, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/20/nation/la-na-nn-new-york-newspaper-gun-permits-
map-offline-20130119. 
 15. See Glenn Coin, NY Safe Act Requires Onondaga County to Release Many Pistol Permit 
Holders' Names, State Official Says, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2013/08/onondaga_county_must_release_pistol_permit_holders_names_addresses_says
_state_op.html.  
 16. See Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Shows Disclosure Law is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2009, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08stream.html. 
 17. Id. 
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III. ALPR USE IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE UK 
As the world now knows, the National Security Administration (NSA) has 
been collecting vast amounts of personal information about American citizens (in 
some cases breaking its own rules and violating the Constitution) and has been 
sharing this information, sometimes even in raw, un-redacted form, with friendly 
foreign intelligence agencies.18  Closer to home, many local governments have 
been quietly amassing large databases of scanned license plates through the use of 
automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems that can scan and track the 
movements of vehicles within their jurisdictions (and beyond, through inter-
departmental collaboration and the aggregation of local databases).19  In fact, 
according to one recent survey with responses from over 70 agencies, 85% of 
responding police departments had or expected to implement ALPR technologies 
within the next five years, and 70 percent of responding agencies reported that they 
already used some form of predictive policing, defined as “the advanced use of 
information/technology to predict and prevent crime.”20  Importantly, as indicated 
earlier, not all use of these systems is inappropriate or even unwanted, but the 
competing tensions between individual privacy, an effective and efficient criminal 
justice system, and public disclosure of government information makes the topic 
ripe for informed and thoughtful analysis. 
In the United States, ALPR systems have become popular with local law 
enforcement and various state and local transportation departments.  Government 
agencies are using these systems to track commercial carriers, facilitate quicker 
passage on toll roads and bridges, and to detect traffic congestion and estimate 
travel times to help motorists navigate away from congested streets or freeways.  
Police departments are also using these systems, whether mounted on stationary 
poles, parking enforcement vehicles, or patrol cars, to locate stolen vehicles or 
other vehicles of interest, and to detect vehicles with unpaid parking tickets as a 
way to generate additional revenue. 
In 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union filed 587 freedom of information 
requests with local law enforcement and other state agencies around the country 
seeking information about ALPR use, resulting in over 26,000 pages of released 
documentation after just 293 responses (50% of the total requests).21  These 
responses indicate that, as a general observation, less than 1 percent of scans 
actually result in a “hit”—or a scan of a license plate in a police database because 
of some (at least alleged) connection to on-going or previous infraction or 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Shares Raw Intelligence 
Including Americans' Data with Israel, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents; Newell, 
supra note 5. 
 19. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Police Across U.S. Quietly Turning to Cameras That Track All 
Vehicles' Movements: Survey, SLATE.COM (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
future_tense/2013/01/14/automatic_license_plate_readers_survey_shows_most_u_s_police_agencies_pl
an.html. 
 20. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: HOW ARE 
INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING? 1 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Technology_web2.pdf. 
 21. See Crump, supra note 6, at 3.  
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suspicious or criminal activity.22 
Surveillance in public spaces is becoming increasingly common,23 and in our 
modern society, corporations, organizations, governments, and even other 
individual citizens are the surveillance agents.24  In the United States, our presence 
in a public space has generally equated to a waiver of any legally enforceable right 
to privacy for anything we do or say in those places—or in information about our 
physical location—on the premise that such information has been voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties by virtue of our very presence in public itself.25  In the 
following sections, this paper survey’s the legal landscape, explores the contents of 
an actual ALPR database, and questions whether rapidly advancing surveillance 
technologies (and particularly ALPR, for present purposes) should cause us to 
rethink how we approach regulating law enforcement collection and retention of 
ALPR data, protecting (or not protecting) privacy in public, and access to 
government information.  
A. The Law in the United States 
At present in the U.S., only six states have laws on the books that directly 
regulate the use of ALPR systems by law enforcement26 and at least two others 
have regulated ALPR use by a directive from the state Attorney General’s office.27  
At least three other states and federal authorities are also considering ways to 
regulate such systems,28 additional states have toll collection or traffic stop statutes 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 13. 
 23. See generally Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281 (2011); ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS 1 (2010) (“Beyond data mining, video surveillance, facial recognition technology, 
spyware, and a host of other invasive tools are opening up private life for public consumption.”). 
 24. Gary T. Marx, Surveillance and Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY 817-22 (G. 
Ritzer ed., 2005), available at http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/surandsoc.html. 
 25. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Helen 
Nissembaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 L. & 
PHIL. 559, 567 (1998); Helen Nissembaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of 
Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207, 212 (1998). But see Von Hannover v. Germany, 
2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 294 (opposing view from the European Court of Human Rights); Newell, supra 
note 5, at 32.  
 26. See Crump, supra note 6, at 31 (noting five states with ALPR laws and two with state Attorney 
General opinions). 
 27. See Va. Op. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 12-073, 2013 WL 653025 (Feb. 13, 2013); Directive No. 
2010-5: Law Enforcement Directive Promulgating Attorney General Guidelines for the Use of 
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and Stored ALPR Data from Paula T. Dow, Att’y Gen., 
N.J., to Dir., Office of Homeland Sec. & Preparedness, et al., (Dec. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/Dir-2010-5-LicensePlateReadersl-120310.pdf 
[hereinafter Directive No. 2010-5]. 
 28. See, e.g., S.B. 226, 2014 Sess. (Fla. 2014), available at http://www.flsenate.gov 
Session/Bill/2014/0226/BillText/c2/PDF (exempting ALPR data from public disclosure); H.B. 3068, 
188th Sess. (Mass. 2013), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H3068; Press Release, 
State Rep. Sam Singh, State Rep. Sam Singh Announces Bill to Regulate Use of License Plate Readers 
(Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://069.housedems.com/news/article/state-rep-sam-singh-announces-bill-
to-regulate-use-of-license-plate-readers.  
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that refer to ALPR,29 and some states have case law precedent related to the use of 
ALPR for various purposes, including traffic stops.30  In the five states with 
enacted legislation, regulation is not at all consistent.   
1. New Hampshire 
In New Hampshire, the state’s Highway Surveillance law strictly prohibits the 
use of ALPR systems,31 as well as other forms of technologically-aided means of 
“determining the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle's 
occupants on the public ways of the state or its political subdivisions” by state or 
local government agents.32  This prohibition extends to the use of “any” device, 
including cameras or other imaging devices, a “transponder, cellular telephone, 
global positioning satellite, or radio frequency identification device,” when used to 
determine the ownership of the vehicle or identity of a person inside the vehicle.33   
The law does provide for a number of exceptions, however, and new 
exceptions became effective in the latter half of 2013.  These exceptions allow state 
agents to conduct such surveillance to facilitate operation of toll collection 
systems,34 to provide security for three named bridges in Portsmouth,35 when such 
surveillance is incidental to state monitoring of state-controlled buildings,36 is 
undertaken “on a case-by-case basis” to investigate specific crimes,37 or when 
images and data are viewed in connection with a specific incident on a public 
roadway (but recording is not allowed).38   
Importantly, the law also prohibits the state and its political subdivisions from 
obtaining any information—specifically, ALPR and related data—that it could not 
collect on its own, regardless of whether the information is from private 
corporations or other federal or state entities.39  This clause limits the ability of law 
enforcement agencies within New Hampshire to access national license plate scan 
databases or to receive license plate information from agencies in other states, 
unless the information-sharing was undertaken in order to investigate a specific 
crime (or under another exception as noted above). 
2. Maine 
Maine’s Motor Vehicle Code prohibits private use of ALPR technology and 
                                                                                                     
 29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-7751(3), (16) (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation) (toll 
collection); MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 25-113(a)(6)(ii)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation) 
(traffic stops). 
 30. See Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 738 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Davila, 901 
N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 31. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b (2007) (prohibiting “automated number plate scanning 
devices”). 
 32. Id. § 236:130(I) (2013). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 236:130(III)(e). 
 35. Id. § 236:130(III)(f). 
 36. Id. § 236:130(III)(d). 
 37. Id. § 236:130(III)(b). 
 38. Id. § 236:130(III)(c). 
 39. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:131 (2006). 
406 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
places restrictions on government use of such systems.40  Interestingly, Maine’s 
statute covers a much more limited set of technologies than the New Hampshire 
law, defining ALPRs more narrowly.  Another section of the code, however, also 
restricts the ability of government agencies from enforcing traffic violations 
through the use of red-light or other traffic surveillance cameras.41  Under the 
Maine law, ALPR is defined as a “system of one or more mobile or fixed high-
speed cameras combined with computer algorithms to convert images of 
registration plates into computer-readable data.”42  Exceptions allow law 
enforcement and the Maine Turnpike Authority to use ALPR for toll 
enforcement.43  The statute also allows the Maine Department of Transportation, 
the Department of Public Safety’s Bureau of State Police, and other state and local 
law enforcement agencies to utilize ALPR for certain stated purposes.44   
To alleviate privacy concerns, the statute restricts the ability of law 
enforcement officers to enter data into the system that does not relate to an ongoing 
investigation or that is not based on articulable facts suggesting safety concerns or 
criminal wrongdoing,45 and any non-hit data (or data not retained by the Bureau of 
State Police for motor vehicle screening purposes) must be purged from the 
database within 21 days from initial capture.46  The statute also specifically 
exempts ALPR data from public disclosure under the state FOI law,47 which 
obviously protects the privacy of individual drivers and vehicle owners but limits 
the availability of data that could be used as a tool of public oversight. 
3. Arkansas 
In 2013, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted House Bill 1996, the 
Automatic License Plate Reader System Act, to regulate the use of ALPR systems 
within the state.48  The Arkansas law also prohibits ALPR use, both by private and 
public entities,49 and provides a number of exceptions where such use is permitted 
for certain purposes.50  It also limits the use of ALPR data as evidence in court 
when the act is violated, and provides for a private cause of action,51 including a 
clause allowing costs and the greater of actual damages or $1,000 per violation, for 
violations of the ALPR limitations.52  Private use is only permitted when such 
systems are used to control access to secured areas not accessible to the public53 or 
to regulate the use of parking facilities.54  However, government parking and law 
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enforcement agencies can also use ALPR systems to regulate the use of parking 
facilities or to compare captured plate data against hot listed plate information from 
certain specified sources, respectively.55 
The Arkansas law also provides some thoughtful regulation of the retention 
and sharing of captured plate data.  Generally, ALPR data captured may not be 
shared, sold, or disclosed to other entities,56 except that law enforcement may share 
captured plate data with other law enforcement agencies as long as the scan data is 
evidence of an offense.57  Otherwise, captured plate data may not be used for 
purposes other than those discussed above. Non-hit data must also be deleted 
within 150 days of initial capture58 and, to help ensure compliance, the law also 
requires law enforcement to update their databases every 24 hours.59   However, 
data collected by law enforcement that is related to an on-going investigation may 
be retained until the conclusion of criminal proceedings.60   
The Arkansas Act does generally exclude public access to actual ALPR scan 
data, and restricts disclosure only to, or with the consent of, the person to whom the 
vehicle is registered.61  The law also requires entities using ALPR systems to 
promulgate official policies,62 and to compile and retain regular statistical reports to 
provide the public with information about the use and efficacy of the technology.63  
In particular, the law requires disclosure of the total number of scans, the number 
of scans resulting in arrest and prosecution, the names of the hot list categories that 
plate data was compared against, the number of confirmed hits or matches with 
information in the hot listed categories, and the total number of false positives (e.g., 
matches improperly made due to faulty character interpretation by an ALPR 
system’s character recognition software).64 
4. Utah 
Utah also passed ALPR legislation in 2013, with the enactment of the 
Automatic License Plate Reader System Act,65 which regulates the use of such 
systems and also amended the state public records law to exclude public access to 
ALPR data66 (with certain exceptions under the state protected records provisions67 
or via certain court orders or a judicial warrant).68  The Utah law also defines 
ALPRs narrowly, with almost identical language as that used in the Maine and 
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Arkansas laws,69 and other sections of the law track the language used in the 
Arkansas law as well.  The Act allows broader exceptions than the Arkansas law, 
however.  In addition to allowing law enforcement to compare ALPR scan data 
with hot list databases, the Utah law also allows police to use ALPR systems “for 
the purpose of protecting public safety, conducting criminal investigations, or 
ensuring compliance with local, state, and federal laws.”70  The Utah law also 
allows ALPR use for enforcing parking regulations, to regulate use of parking 
facilities, controlling access to secure areas, for collecting electronic tolls, and for 
“enforcing motor carrier laws.”71 
Private entities may not store ALPR data for longer than 30 days and public 
agencies must delete data within nine months, unless the data is subject to a 
preservation request, disclosure order, or properly issued warrant.72  The law also 
prohibits selling or sharing ALPR data for reasons not enumerated in the statute, 
and allows—but does not require—ALPR users to compile aggregated reports or 
compilations of ALPR data and to conduct statistical analysis of the captured data, 
as long as the records are anonymized.73  Finally, the law contains provisions for 
preservation orders requiring agencies to preserve captured data under certain 
circumstances.74 
5. Vermont 
Vermont’s ALPR law was also enacted in 2013.75  It defines an ALPR system 
just as in Maine, Arkansas, and Utah, but differentiates between “active” and 
“historical” data.76  Active data includes plate information entered into system hot 
lists and plate data captured by routine use of ALPR systems, whereas historical 
data is defined as any ALPR data “stored on the statewide ALPR server operated 
by the Vermont Justice Information Sharing System of the Department of Public 
Safety.”77  Thus, Vermont has legislatively authorized a statewide ALPR database 
that facilitates information sharing between state and local agencies.  As evidenced 
by an ALPR End User Agreement obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Vermont in 2012, the State stored plate information for four years78 prior to 
enactment of the ALPR law, which limited retention to 18 months in most cases.79  
This database is the primary repository for ALPR data collected within the state, as 
the law requires law enforcement agencies using ALPR systems to upload their 
                                                                                                     
 69. See id. § 41-6a-2002(1) (defining an “[a]utomatic license plate reader system" as “a system of 
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 70. Id. § 41-6a-2003(2)(a). 
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 72. Id. § 41-6a-2004(c).  
 73. Id. §§ 41-6a-2004(2)(a)-(c). 
 74. Id. § 41-6a-2005. 
 75. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 legislation). 
 76. Id. at § 1607(a). 
 77. Id. §§ 1607(a)(1), (3). 
 78. Vt. Dept. of Pub. Safety, Div. of Crim. Just., ALPR End User Agreement, available at 
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scan data to the statewide server.80  The Vermont law allows the Vermont 
Information and Analysis Center, which manages the database, to share historical 
ALPR data with both Vermont and out-of-state law enforcement agencies for 
certain law enforcement purposes.81  
The statute also requires officers to be certified to operate an ALPR system,82 
and restricts use of ALPR systems to certain enumerated “legitimate law 
enforcement purposes.”83  Officers are also prohibited from accessing active ALPR 
data or inputting plate information for non-legitimate purposes.84  The law requires 
written requests to review data and limits access to ALPR information collected 
more than seven days prior to the request.85 
For oversight purposes, the law requires the Department of Public Safety to 
institute internal safeguards to ensure that law enforcement are using the systems in 
accordance with the law, and also requires the Department submit an annual report 
to the State legislature detailing the number of ALPR units in operation statewide, 
the number of units transmitting data to the state servers, the total numbers of scans 
submitted by each agency to the state servers, the total number of scans contained 
in the 18-month state-run repository, the total number of requests for ALPR data 
from the state database, and the number of these requests fulfilled (for domestic 
and out-of-state requestors).  
6. California 
California’s Vehicle Code authorizes the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to 
utilize ALPR data but limits retention to 60 days, unless the “data is being used as 
evidence” in a felony case.86  The Code mandates internal monitoring for 
unauthorized use of ALPR data87 and also specifies that the CHP 
shall not sell LPR data for any purpose and shall not make the data available to an 
agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law 
enforcement officer.  The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for 
purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of 
being involved in the commission of a public offense.88 
The CHP must also submit information about ALPR usage (including data 
disclosures) to the state legislature as part of its annual vehicle theft report.89  In 
addition to CHP usage, many other jurisdictions in California maintain ALPR 
systems, and the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) 
                                                                                                     
 80. See id. § 1607(d). 
 81. See id. § 1607(c)(2)(A). 
 82. Id. § 1607(a)(4). 
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coordinates ALPR data from over 20 police departments.90  
7. Virginia 
In Virginia, the state Attorney General has issued an opinion limiting state law 
enforcement from collecting passive ALPR data (i.e., passively scanning and 
storing every plate passing by) under the Government Data Collection and 
Dissemination Practices Act.91  Instead, law enforcement can only use license plate 
readers to “actively” scan and store plates that have been particularly identified, 
“evaluated and determined to be relevant to criminal activity.”92 
8. New Jersey 
In New Jersey, law enforcement use of ALPR systems is regulated by an 
Attorney General Directive promulgated in 2010.93  The Directive itself explicitly 
recognizes the role of mining ALPR data for detecting suspicious patterns—a form 
of predictive policing.94  It also provides guidelines95 for ALPR use by state and 
local law enforcement agencies, and requires them to develop policies consistent 
with these guidelines.  These guidelines attempt to ensure that plate numbers are 
only entered into ALPR hotlist databases for legitimate law enforcement purposes, 
that ALPR data is only accessible by appropriate personnel, and to ensure data is 
“purged after a reasonable period of time.”96  Additionally, the guidelines state that 
law enforcement policies should be designed 
to permit a thorough analysis of stored ALPR data to detect crime and protect the 
homeland from terrorist attack while safeguarding the personal privacy rights of 
motorists by ensuring that the analysis of stored ALPR data is not used as a means 
to disclose personal identifying information about an individual unless there is a 
legitimate and documented law enforcement reason for disclosing such personal 
information to a law enforcement officer or civilian crime analyst.97 
B. ALPR Systems in Canada and the UK 
ALPR technology was originally developed in the UK, at Cambridge 
University, in response to threats from the Irish Republican Army.98  Recently, the 
UK Information Commissioner found that the use of ALPR cameras at every entry 
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and exit point to a small British city (a so-called “Ring of Steel”) violated the UK 
Data Protection Act as being unlawful and excessive.99 
Canadian law enforcement has also been utilizing ALPR systems since initial 
RCMP testing in 2006.100  Most recently, and most relevant to the present 
discussion, the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner (BCIPC) 
conducted an investigation of the use of ALPR by the Victoria Police Department 
(VPD) and RCMP in late 2012, concluding that certain practices violated 
provincial privacy law.101  In particular, the BCIPC concluded that VPD retention 
of non-hit plate information, and subsequent sharing of this information with the 
RCMP, violated the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
(FIPPA).  Importantly, the BCIPC stated that 
FIPPA authorizes the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for a 
law enforcement purpose. VICPD collects personal information for the purpose of 
comparison against the alert listing. Once this comparison is accomplished, the 
authorized use of information associated with non-hits and obsolete-hits has been 
exhausted. FIPPA does not authorize VICPD to continue to use this information 
unless it obtains the consent of the individual that the information is about. VICPD 
is likewise not authorized to disclose this information to the RCMP.102 
This approach, codified in British Columbian law and the equivalent federal 
legislation, takes significant steps toward respecting personal information privacy 
as the right to control access to and uses of personal information,103 even requiring 
consent for the continued storage and analysis of personal information gathered in a 
public space.  Against the backdrop of recent legal American developments in the 
D.C. Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court,104 this approach will be well suited to inform 
the future of Fourth Amendment reform in the United States. 
IV. FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY IN PUBLIC  
A. Defining and Defending Privacy 
As used throughout this paper, informational privacy is defined as the right to 
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control access to and uses of personal information.105 This definition explicitly 
recognizes that individuals should have some rights to control not just access to 
personal information, but also some subsequent uses of that information,106 even 
after disclosure to third parties in certain circumstances.  This definition recognizes 
that certain actions may waive, explicitly or impliedly, a privacy interest.  
Additionally, the definition is informed by the mosaic theory of the Fourth 
Amendment recently considered in the wake of recent decisions in U.S. v. Jones107 
and U.S. v. Maynard.108  A person’s right to limit access to and use of certain 
personal information (e.g., a person’s current or past geographic location) that has 
not been kept strictly “secret” by virtue of the fact that is was available in a public 
space should still, in some circumstances, remain legally enforceable under the 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable search or seizure.  
In essence, this is an argument for a right to privacy in certain information that, 
when viewed discretely or in the aggregate, is generally not qualitatively or 
quantitatively available to the public at large (or, as Judge Ginsburg of the Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia phrased it, such information is not actually or 
constructively exposed to the public109).  The aggregation of geolocation 
information over a substantial time period allows law enforcement to easily 
discover information that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different than 
what is knowingly and voluntarily exposed to the public at large, even though it is, 
in essence, just an aggregation of distinct bits of information individually exposed 
to the public (although tracking a person’s cell phone also allows tracking when a 
person is inside a private building or, potentially, in the sanctity of their home,110 
which is distinctly private information).  
In this pursuit, this paper will examine the proposition made by Justice 
Sotomayor in Jones that the time has come to rethink the legal significance of 
allowing third-party access to personal information when considering privacy 
interests in public spaces.  By restricting the third-party rule in our Fourth 
Amendment analysis, such that any release of information to a third party is not 
necessarily a complete and total waiver to all forms of access and use by anyone at 
all, we respect the drastic changes in technological possibilities and their proper 
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role in government investigations while maintaining checks on improper abuse of 
authority.  Defining privacy normatively in terms of control of access and use of 
personal information in this context can adequately protect informational privacy 
and balance the competing, and very important, interest in effective law 
enforcement. 
B. Problems with Binary Fourth Amendment Theory 
In the Fourth Amendment search context, legal definitions have often been 
crafted to force conclusions about potential privacy violations based on binary 
distinctions: either a form of investigation or information gathering by government 
agents constitutes a search or it does not.111  This binary conceptualization of 
Fourth Amendment inquiry itself is not inherently problematic—in fact, it may be 
highly desirable.  However, strictly applying the third-party doctrine—the idea that 
most information disclosed to some other entity attracts no legally protectable 
expectation of privacy—and the binary public/private dichotomy may improperly 
restrict Fourth Amendment protections of personal privacy, especially when 
considering whether individuals ought to maintain some right to privacy in public 
spaces.  
Arguing that something “public” is, or should be, private and protected by 
legal rules is a difficult task.  On its face, it rings of the paradoxical. Philosophical 
theories of privacy have primarily focused, with valid reasons, on privacy interests 
in sensitive and intimate information that have not been disclosed voluntarily to the 
public.  Whether geolocation information, even when aggregated over time, should 
be protected is an open and controversial question.  When a person, “X,” steps 
outside of their home and walks down a busy public street, it is easy to conclude 
that they have waived their right to claim a privacy interest in the fact that they are 
walking down the street in plain view of other pedestrians, police officers, and 
anyone else in the near vicinity.  It seems ridiculous to suggest we should “turn off 
our eyes.”  But should the fact that the eyes in the scene happen to be those of 
sophisticated robots or other electronic devices (drones, CCTV cameras, 
smartphones, Google Glass, or an ALPR camera) alter this conclusion?  Or, rather 
than turn off our eyes (or recording devices), should we require the use of privacy-
preserving technologies, such as an anti-monitoring suit112 or device that obscures 
the view of nearby lenses? 
It seems intuitive to argue that these bystanders cannot, and should not, be 
restricted from later telling someone else, including a police officer, about what 
they observed.  Of course, this characterization assumes that we enter public spaces 
in a truly voluntary fashion.  This might be debatable, as we often are required to 
pass through public spaces to supply ourselves with food or engage in work, and 
such a distinction would only strengthen a claim to a right to privacy in public.  
However, despite this important caveat, the third-party rule makes some sense 
insofar as it requires us to conclude that such a privacy interest has been waived in 
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these circumstances and in relation to those who also temporally occupy and share 
the same space—they are the primary, if not intended, “recipients” of that 
information.  However, this situation becomes increasingly complex as we 
introduce various technological means of surveillance into the scene, particularly if 
the surveillance technologies are capable of recording data that can be easily 
searched and mined for relevant information years into the future, as is the case 
with some ALPR databases (absent the existence of more limiting data destruction 
polices).  
Suppose we introduce a few security cameras (perhaps a variety of red light 
cameras, ALPR cameras, and CCTV cameras) into the street scene described 
above.  Now, X’s walk down the street is also observable by a security officer in a 
control room, perhaps located somewhere else entirely.  If the security system is 
also capable of recording the video stream, the officer—or anyone else with 
access—can later watch, rewind, and manipulate the recording without much 
trouble.  If the third-party doctrine (as currently interpreted) holds, the fact that X is 
walking down the street in view of the cameras also means that X has waived her 
privacy interests vis-à-vis the control room operator and anyone with authority to 
view the resulting recording.  In our current technological and social climate, 
security cameras might not even pose the most serious threat to the permanent 
recording of our innocuous public meanderings, merely because they capture so 
little of it as a consequence of their limited placement (although whether placement 
is still “limited” is debatable, as levels of video surveillance have been rapidly 
increasing for years)113 and individual online vigilantism, compounded with the 
ubiquitous nature of personal recording devices, may be increasingly likely to 
expose our public meanderings and embarrassing blunders.  
Reverting to the earlier caveat, as we increase the duration, extent, and means 
of the intrusion facilitated by the various mechanisms of surveillance in the scene, 
are we further undermining the ‘voluntariness’ of a person’s presence in public, 
and thus the idea that privacy has been waived in respect to that information?  If 
information privacy rights revolve around the right to control access to and uses of 
our personal information, the additional and automatic information flow from lens 
to screen to hard disk to long-term archive encroaches on our right to control the 
use of the information for temporally restricted purposes, which has been 
abandoned solely because of technological intervention.  At what point can, or 
should, our presence in public constitute a waiver of privacy rights in all potential 
future uses?  
Many people on the street are likely carrying cell phones and other devices 
capable of recording video or photo, often with GPS location information built into 
the accessible metadata.  This more recent reality introduces a sort of horizontal or 
non-organizational surveillance (citizens watching citizens) that has begun to breed 
new forms of vigilantism online.  Imagine the person walking down the street is 
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also carrying a smartphone.  The cellular service provider is probably collecting 
continuous geolocational information and maintaining a database of the phone’s 
location.  Thus the service provider can make a pretty good determination of where 
the person is (was), which direction they are (were) walking, and at what speed 
they are (were) traveling.  Companies like Google, Microsoft, and Apple are also 
providing live traffic congestion data for their electronic maps services, sourced, at 
least in large part, from tracking the cellphones of anyone wielding a phone 
running their preferred maps application or operating system.  Supposedly this 
information is being sourced anonymously, but presumably this is based on 
corporate desire to avoid public outcry rather than any technological limitations, 
and the technological ability of law enforcement to acquire specific information 
from these services providers—as opposed to the wireless providers—is, as far as 
the author is aware, still an open question.   
Additionally, the increasing effectiveness of facial recognition software, even 
in consumer products like Facebook, means that the capture of X’s image by fellow 
streetwalker or CCTV camera can also lead to direct identification of X. Now, not 
only does X’s place on the public sidewalk waive her right to privacy in the fact of 
her location, it could potentially mean that X has waived her right to keep her 
identity anonymous from anyone who might be watching, including at significant 
distance (or at a different time) through forms of visual surveillance enhanced by 
facial recognition.  Any proponent of a right to anonymity in public spaces should 
be rightly concerned that walking the third-party doctrine to its limits in the face of 
advancing technology would seriously erode this aspect of privacy across society. 
On the other hand, increased visual surveillance of society may result in more 
efficient policing, crime reduction, and safer streets—although this point is 
challenged widely. 
Returning to our example, if X concludes her walk by entering her car, parked 
some distance down the street in this example, and driving away, she is now 
susceptible to additional tracking via ALPR systems and traffic cameras installed 
and maintained by local police departments and departments of transportation. 
Even if the departments are regularly deleting the images and license plate 
information through automated processes, these systems promise the ability to 
track automobiles in real-time and save data that might be useful in active 
investigations.  Indeed, the District of Columbia Police Department has utilized its 
extensive camera system to track vehicles of suspected criminals in real-time114 and 
other police departments have used similar systems to gather information about 
when and where certain vehicles entered and left municipal boundaries or were 
present in certain locations near criminal incidents.115 
The proposition that the person has waived any and all privacy interests in all 
of this “public” information about the person’s present or historical location can 
still be made, but the situation is qualitatively different when the government has 
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such easy access to vast amounts of historical and aggregated geolocation 
information that can be used to determine patterns or even potentially predict future 
movements statistically.  Of course, nothing is stopping a bystander or police 
officer from trailing X and recording her movements in public, as long as the 
trailing does not constitute harassment.  However, the likelihood that an officer, or 
team of officers, would trail X continuously for months at a time making constant 
notes about precise locations and movements, including time spent at each location, 
was extremely low when cases like Knotts116 and Miller117 were decided.  
Presumably it remains so today.118  Regardless, the ease with which surveillance 
can be conducted today makes it much less expensive and time consuming and, 
presumably then, more likely to occur.  Rather than a team of dedicated agents 
tailing a suspect for weeks or months on end, a single officer need just notify a 
cellular service provider that locational information is needed from a particular 
phone (or query a large ALPR database), and pages of detailed, searchable data 
could be delivered almost instantaneously, alleviating the need to physically trail 
the suspect completely (at least for the acquisition of locational information).  
Increased efficiency of law enforcement investigation tactics is hardly a sound 
basis for requiring additional restrictions (indeed, this would be unfortunate).  
However, the qualitative differences in the information deemed public and the 
inferences that can be drawn about additional personal information suggest that 
certain aspects of the third-party doctrine can, and should be, critically examined.  
Traditional trespass-based decisions, recently reinvigorated by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Jones, have determined whether a search has 
occurred on the basis of whether a property interest has been infringed by a 
government agent.  The two-pronged Katz reasonable expectations of privacy 
test,119 despite the allure, or dangers of its “hypothetical reasonable person” 
standard, has failed to modernize in pace with investigative technologies used by 
law enforcement around the country and remains subject to binary distinctions of 
legal significance, such as the public/private dichotomy and a strict adherence to 
the third-party doctrine or the idea that once information is released to any third-
party, privacy interests vis-à-vis the government, when acquiring the information 
from the third-party, are waived.  Indeed, despite calling for empirical evidence of 
societal expectations of privacy when examining the constitutionality of criminal 
investigations conducted by government agents, this hypothetical reasonable 
person has rarely (if ever) been a stand-in for relevant social science research on 
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what members of the contemporary society actually expect;120 rather courts have 
applied the test as a proxy for the work of social scientists and socio-legal scholars.  
It has been suggested that the prevalence of binary dichotomies in Fourth 
Amendment case law is a consequence of courts and lawyers attempting to find 
easy lines to draw in court.121  However, the difficulties faced by the courts to apply 
the Katz test uniformly, problematic application of the third-party doctrine in cases 
involving government use of emerging technologies, and a resounding call by 
commentators that Fourth Amendment legal theory is in chaos (and has been for 
some time), suggest that the lines may not be as easy to draw at all.  Perhaps the 
time has come to rethink Fourth Amendment theory and reduce the legal 
significance of some of the problematic binary distinctions that have plagued court 
decisions for years, such as certain applications of the third-party doctrine.  
C. The Third Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine has been described as “the Fourth Amendment rule 
scholars love to hate.”122 For years, it has been subjected to voluminous amounts of 
criticism, both by legal scholars and state courts.123  The Supreme Court has upheld 
the rule, holding that citizens “assume the risk” that what they disclose to a third 
party will be transferred on to the government, but has not explicitly defended it.124  
And now, after Jones, criticism of the rule has reached the Supreme Court itself.   
In its early years, the third-party doctrine was applied in cases involving 
undercover agents and confidential informants.125 These cases held that defendants 
could not claim Fourth Amendment violations based off of conversations with 
government agents—sometimes wearing wires—because the “the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect ‘a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.’”126 In later cases, 
the Court applied the doctrine to business records.  In United States v. Miller, the 
Supreme Court held that a bank depositor does not have any reasonable expectation 
of privacy in financial information (in the form of deposit slips, checks, and bank 
records) because such information was conveyed voluntarily to the bank and 
“exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”127 As such, the 
court found that 
[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . . [T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
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confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.128 
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor stated that the time had come 
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to discard the premise that legitimate 
expectations of privacy could only be found in situations of near or complete 
secrecy.129  Sotomayor argued that people should be able to maintain reasonable 
expectations of privacy in some information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. 
The opposite and historical view of the court, Sotomayor stated, was “ill suited to 
the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”130  Sotomayor 
considered that logs of phone calls, text messages, websites visited, email 
correspondence, purchase histories from online retailers, and geolocational 
information were all forms of information that were technically disclosed to third 
parties through mundane tasks, but where such disclosure should not constitute 
waiver of all privacy interests.131  “[W]hatever the societal expectations,” 
Sotomayor stated, these forms of information  
can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not 
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for 
a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.132 
However, discarding the idea behind the third-party doctrine completely seems 
ludicrous.  Intuitively, what a person exposes to the public is just that—public.  It 
loses its status as private information exactly because a person voluntarily puts it in 
the public view.  To hold otherwise in all cases might seriously undermine free 
speech and other important Constitutional guarantees.  Certain applications of the 
doctrine are not necessarily troublesome.  For example, the suggestion that an 
officer may tail a suspect while on public roads without first obtaining a warrant 
seems entirely reasonable.  After all, the information gained by the officer by 
physically following the suspect is precisely what the suspect has openly and 
voluntarily exposed to the public at large.  Extending this doctrine, we can 
conclude that an officer (or likely a large team of officers) should be allowed to tail 
a suspect continuously for weeks at a time, all the while making copious notes 
about the suspect’s movements and locations in publicly accessible spaces.   
What, then is the problem with allowing the officer to utilize a more efficient 
means of gathering the same information, namely through contacting the suspect’s 
wireless provider and getting a log of geolocational data related to the suspect’s 
phone (which has presumably remained near the suspect)?  This question is a 
difficult critique of the position I present in this paper, but I believe it can be 
overcome.  I also do not feel that my argument is aimed at hindering the efficiency 
of law enforcement work without solid philosophical grounds.  As stated by Justice 
Sotomayor, the situation with prolonged geolocational tracking is different 
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precisely because the technological surveillance “evades the ordinary checks that 
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and 
community hostility’”133 and allows the government to obtain personal information 
about individuals that is qualitatively and quantitatively different in kind than what 
would be discovered alternatively.  The likelihood that, in the case of physical 
tailing, such a time consuming and resource-intensive investigation would be 
carried out regularly without a sound basis is very small.  Police are very unlikely 
to devote such time and resources to this kind of visual surveillance except in cases 
that really warrant it.  On the other hand, the ease and convenience of obtaining 
records from wireless providers could allow government agents virtually unfettered 
ability to conduct this sort of surveillance in a wide variety of cases, including 
“fishing expeditions” not based on any level of suspicion, probable cause or 
otherwise.  However, this position could potentially limit some important 
investigations from proceeding as efficiently as they might have based purely on 
departmental lack of resources to conduct extensive visual surveillance.  But 
requiring a warrant, based on affirmation of probable cause, before allowing 
government agents to collect and analyze such extensive digital information, 
should not be a serious impediment to most investigations and would help restrict 
this sort of surveillance to legitimate investigations.  Additionally, other exceptions 
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, such as the emergency 
doctrine,134 would continue to ameliorate these concerns in practice when time is of 
the essence. 
However, by limiting a strict application of the third-party doctrine, new 
questions emerge about where lines should be drawn between permissible and 
impermissible tactics in other contexts.  For example, what are the important 
differences—if any—between aggregating geolocational information, bank records, 
“private” communication or messages on a social network like Facebook, web 
browsing or search histories, or electronic purchase histories collected and archived 
over time?  The mosaic theory, originally announced by Judge Ginsburg in U.S. v 
Maynard, may begin to help us sort out these difficult questions.135   
D. Public Surveillance, the Mosaic, and the Fourth Amendment  
Some scholars have claimed that recent (and even not so recent) advances in 
digital technologies and surveillance capabilities mean that we should rethink 
whether we can maintain any legitimate expectations of privacy while out in 
public—or in “public facts.”  In Jones, Justice Sotomayor proposed that the third-
party doctrine should be abandoned (or at least rethought) in the face of 
confronting Fourth Amendment challenges related to investigative use of new 
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technologies.136  Justice Alito’s separate concurrence in Jones expressed concern 
about the robustness of the “reasonable expectations of privacy test”—even while 
advocating its use in that case—because of the potential that the widespread use of 
new surveillance technologies could resign the populace to subjectively expect less 
privacy than should be afforded under the Constitution.137  Indeed, geolocational 
tracking technologies—which have now been used by law enforcement agencies 
for some time—allow law enforcement to easily compile thousands of pages of 
information about our present and past travels—in very exacting detail—and to 
mine that information indiscriminately for patterns.138  Courts have also clearly 
stated that Fourth Amendment law has failed to keep pace with advancing 
technological possibilities.  In one recent Ninth Circuit case, the court stated that 
[t]he extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents 
of electronic communications in the Internet age is an open question.  The recently 
minted standard of electronic communication via e-mails, text messages, and other 
means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been 
little explored.139  
Prior to Jones, the precedential locational tracking case was United States v. 
Knotts.140  In that case, the Court held that police use of a “beeper”—a much more 
rudimentary and non-exact form of tracking a suspect by radio transmissions141did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment because a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their movements on a public road.142  Police placed the 
beeper at issue in a container of chloroform prior to codefendant Petschen’s 
purchasing the container and placing it in his car.  The court stated that 
[v]isual surveillance from public places along Petschen’s route or adjoining 
Knotts’ premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.  The 
fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but on the 
use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen’s automobile to the police 
receiver, does not alter the situation.  Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited 
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with 
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.143 
This decision grants the government the authority to amplify, or replace, their 
own visual surveillance of a suspect moving in public spaces on the rationale that 
all of the surveillance could have been done lawfully by actual officers tailing and 
observing the suspect’s movements.  However, it also did more than just augment 
visual possibilities, despite the comparatively limited information produced by the 
beeper as compared to modern GPS tracking technologies.  For example, at one 
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point the officers in Knotts lost sight of the car they were tailing and subsequently 
fell out of range of the beeper, effectively losing their target.144  They later found 
the device using a helicopter to sweep the area scanning for the beeper’s signal and 
located the device near a cabin occupied by Knotts.145  This use of the location 
tracking technology did more than simply augment the sensory capabilities of the 
officers—it allowed them to locate a suspect using purely technological means 
after visual tracking had failed.  More recently, the facts of the Jones and Maynard 
cases provide stark contrast to the limited technological capabilities and judicial 
reasoning in Knotts. 
In 2004, Lawrence Maynard managed a nightclub in the District of Columbia 
owned by Antoine Jones.  That year, an FBI-Metropolitan Police Department task 
force began investigating Jones and Maynard (and several other alleged co-
conspirators) for narcotics violations.  During the course of the investigation, 
officers conducted visual surveillance of the nightclub, installed a video camera 
focused on the front door of the club, and captured pen register information and 
instituted a wiretap of Jones’s cellular phone.146  Based on information gathered 
during this initial surveillance, the officers applied for and obtained a warrant to 
place an electronic GPS tracking device on an automobile regularly used by Jones 
(but registered to his wife).147  The warrant authorized the government to install the 
device on the vehicle within the District of Columbia within a ten-day time period.  
Eleven days later, the officers installed the device while the vehicle was in 
Maryland in violation of the terms of the warrant—a claim the government 
admitted to in the litigation, while still maintaining that a court order was not 
required by law in the first place.  Eventually, Maynard and Jones were tried jointly 
and convicted of various drug related offenses. On appeal, the Circuit Court for the 
District of Columbia reversed Jones’s conviction based on his claim that the 
government’s warrantless GPS tracking of his vehicle 24 hours a day for 28 days 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.148  Importantly, while announcing the 
“mosaic theory,” the court found that 
unlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of one's movements 
over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the 
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil… [and] the 
whole of one's movements is not exposed constructively even though each 
individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a 
great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.149 
The court compared this case of prolonged modern surveillance with prior 
national security cases where the government regularly invoked the “mosaic 
theory” to shield certain otherwise public records from disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act because, “[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, 
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may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.”150  The 
court continued by stating that 
[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term 
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what 
he does ensemble.  These types of information can each reveal more about a 
person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.  Repeated visits to a 
church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does 
one's not visiting any of these places over the course of a month.  The sequence of 
a person's movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office 
tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a 
baby supply store tells a different story.  A person who knows all of another's 
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular 
at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an 
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact 
about a person, but all such facts.151 
This concern was later voiced loudly by the Justices in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jones, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court. 
Combining the third-party doctrine with the modern realities of massive data 
collection made possible because of the ubiquitous nature of contemporary 
communications devices means that location data, even historical data, is becoming 
much easier for law enforcement to obtain without the need to secure a warrant 
supported by probable cause, even without planting physical devices and risking 
committing physical trespass.  Indeed, the police in Jones did obtain historical 
geolocation information from Jones’s wireless provider, but chose to rely on the 
data collected through a physical tracking device installed on Jones’s vehicle 
during the trial.  The present ability of law enforcement to so easily amass and 
mine such enormous amounts of personal information through simple technological 
tools and coordination with service providers (such as wireless service providers, 
email providers, or social network service providers) begs an examination of 
current Fourth Amendment theory, the reasonable expectations of privacy test, and 
the third-party doctrine. 
E. The “Mosaic Theory” of the Fourth Amendment 
Underlying the “mosaic theory” is the idea that the courts can sometimes 
consider the information gathered through government surveillance (or presumably 
the surveillance activities of government agents—depending on where we draw the 
line) in the aggregate when deciding when a “search” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes has occurred, rather than being required to focus sequentially on each 
distinct piece of information or government act.152  The theory was introduced by 
Justice Ginsburg in United States v. Maynard, the decision by the D.C Circuit that 
led to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Jones case.  In his opinion, Judge 
Ginsburg introduced the mosaic standard, focusing on whether the government’s 
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investigation caused them to learn “more than a stranger would have observed.”153  
Early commentary has resulted in both academic praise and criticism of the idea of 
a mosaic theory.  Potentially, considering this information, and government 
surveillance practices, in the aggregate could help modernize existing theory, and 
reflects a pragmatic approach to respecting forms of informational privacy that 
would comport with legitimate expectations of privacy despite not necessarily 
being consistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Critics express 
concern that implementing this new theory would throw Fourth Amendment law 
into deeper chaos and will require the courts to confront an expansive array of 
practical questions and draw more arbitrary lines without precedential guidance.154  
Prior to the recent judicial consideration the mosaic theory by the D.C. Circuit 
and Supreme Court, searches have been determined by what Orin Kerr calls the 
“sequential approach.”155  Under this approach, courts “analyze whether 
government action constitutes a Fourth Amendment search or seizure [by taking] a 
snapshot of the act and assess[ing] it in isolation.”156  According to Kerr, the “step-
by-step” or “frame-by-frame analysis” is inherent in and foundational to evaluating 
Fourth Amendment claims.157 
However, in Maynard, the Circuit Court “likened the aggregate of Jones’s 
movements to a mosaic, where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.”158 
Justice Ginsburg imported the theory from cases where Freedom of Information 
Act requests were weighed against national security interests because “[d]isparate 
items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, 
can take on added significance when combined with other items of information.”159  
Thus, according to Justice Ginsburg, the difference between the whole array of 
potentially public information and any distinct part “is not one of degree but of 
kind.”160  Access to the whole set of documents could allow enemies to ascertain or 
infer additional private information.  Such it is with geolocational information and 
the present ability of law enforcement to track individuals comprehensively for 
weeks on end without any physical trailing.  Apparent support for these ideas at the 
Supreme Court may signal an opportunity to reform the Fourth Amendment 
analysis in such a way that provides important protections for personal information 
control in a world of quickly advancing technology and rising risks of improper 
access to growing amounts of personal information stored in electronic computer 
databases. 
F. Finding a Legal Basis for Privacy in Public 
Since Justice Harlan announced a two-part test in a concurring opinion in Katz 
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v. United States161 in 1967, whether or not a person maintains a right to privacy—
for Fourth Amendment search purposes—is based on whether any subjective 
expectation of privacy maintained by the individual asserting the privacy interest is 
“one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”162  Generally in the 
United States, courts have found that information released to the public could not 
be the subject of any legitimate expectation of privacy under this test.  From 1967 
until the Jones decision in 2012, the reasonable expectation of privacy test largely 
succeeded the prior focus on whether the government has violated a property right, 
such as by committing trespass, in conducting a search. Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Jones, however, reinvigorated the trespass doctrine for searches where 
physical trespass had occurred, while allowing for the continued use of the Katz 
test when non-trespassory interests are allegedly violated.  In Jones, the court held 
that unwarranted placement of a GPS tracking device by the government on a 
vehicle frequently used by the defendant, a suspected drug trafficker, violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the officers committed a trespass by physically 
attaching the device to the vehicle.  This opinion left open the Fourth Amendment 
question for searches conducted without any physical trespass, such as when the 
government tracks a cell phone’s location electronically.  Additionally, the justices 
were writing in response to the lower court’s decision by Judge Ginsburg of the 
D.C. Circuit that espoused the so called “mosaic theory”—the idea the certain 
government investigation tactics, such as tracking suspects via GPS devices or 
geolocation data provided by cellular phone service providers (or, presumably, 
other forms of data mining a wide variety of electronic records and online 
information), empowered the government to accumulate such a detailed digital 
picture of a person’s life, routines, habits, and travels that the information gathering 
itself triggered Fourth Amendment protection, despite the fact that a search for any 
individual piece of the same data might not have done so because the information 
was in some sense publicly available.  In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor 
expressed her worries that this sort of technologically enhanced investigation 
changed the balance at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. 
In cases involving even short-term monitoring  . . . GPS monitoring generates a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.  The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them 
for information years into the future.  And because GPS monitoring is cheap in 
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds 
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: “limited police resources and community hostility.”163 
Despite the radical shift that such dicta might indicate for the future of Fourth 
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Amendment doctrine, Justice Sotomayor’s call for greater protections for some 
activity occurring in the public sphere is not the first time the idea has been 
suggested in the courts.  In the Katz decision itself, Justice Stewart stated that  
[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.164 
In that case, the government had placed a listening device to the exterior of a 
public phone booth, and had recorded the defendant making phone calls.  The court 
found that Katz maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations 
while inside the phone booth, even though it was in a public place, because the 
court felt that  
a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll 
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters 
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution 
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play 
in private communication.165 
The court continued its “discrediting” of the view that only trespass could raise 
constitutional questions, elaborating that  
once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply 
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the 
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion into any given enclosure.166 
Reading this language alongside Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, parallels 
begin to emerge.  The expectation that shutting the glass door to a public phone 
booth makes the conversation private is entirely consistent with the proposition that 
emails sent to an associate, purchase histories shared only with the online 
merchant, geolocational information shared only with a cellphone service provider,  
or a social networking status update visible only to a select groups of friends (due 
to actively setting and maintaining privacy settings to ensure such limited 
publication), could also be considered legitimate contexts where a reasonable 
expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the government could adhere.167  However, the 
historical reliance on the third-party doctrine would presumably discredit these 
otherwise reasonable expectations merely because the information was disclosed to 
an intermediary (e.g., Google, Facebook, Verizon, T-Mobile, Amazon) or a select 
group of friends.  Thus, the government is free to demand and subpoena this 
information from these intermediaries without obtaining a warrant or attesting to 
probable cause in court.  However, the “vital role” that the public telephone played 
in facilitating private communication (even in public spaces) in 1967 has been 
superseded by a variety of electronic wireless communications technologies (e.g., 
                                                                                                     
 164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 165. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. at 353. 
 167. See Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, supra note 5. 
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cell phones, email, text messaging, and private messaging on social media 
websites) that also collect and transmit a wealth of data (such as geographic 
coordinates) that find no easy corollary in the Katz analogy.   
Some lower federal courts have begun to question a strict application of the 
third-party doctrine as well.  In 2010, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of 
whether the government violated the Fourth Amendment when agents compelled 
an ISP to turn over the contents of the defendant’s emails without first obtaining a 
warrant.168  In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that, even though the subscriber 
agreement allowed the ISP to access the contents of its clients’ emails in certain 
circumstances, “the mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents 
of a communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”169  The court found that this conclusion was consistent with the Katz 
holding, because the telephone service company in the prior case also had a legal 
right to listen to phone calls in certain cases.  The Warshak court also differentiated 
the facts in that case from those in Miller, because the third-party ISP was merely 
an intermediary rather than the intended recipient (as the bank was in Miller).  
Under the rationale in this case, the government could not demand the information 
from the intermediary corporation or service provider, but the conclusion would not 
necessarily extend to information released by the recipients of the communication, 
such as the email recipient or Facebook friend.  Whether this was the right result, 
or merely a step in the right direction, remains the subject of some controversy.  
However, as evidenced by the recent indication by the five concurring justices in 
Jones (Sotomayor was the most explicit, but Alito’s opinion can also be read this 
way) that they may be willing to rethink Fourth Amendment theory,170 the time 
may be ripe for further challenges to precedent.  Indeed, the fact that the Jones 
decision followed from the introduction of the mosaic theory in the lower court’s 
decision signals that the justices may be willing to entertain this issue in coming 
years. 
The recognition of the Court in Katz itself of this relationship between the 
Fourth Amendment, private communications, and technological change, provides 
ample support for the proposition that these new forms of private communication 
(and the variety of additional opportunities they provide, both to government and 
individuals) should be carefully protected as well.  This analysis is more 
problematic, however, when applied to geolocational information, which is not 
clearly a form of communication but more like a public fact. The mosaic theory 
provides one way to sidestep this concern, focusing on the qualitative difference 
between visual confirmation of a person’s location and the vast history of 
geolocational data potentially stored by—or accessible to—law enforcement 
through modern tracking technologies, while preserving the idea that new 
technologies should receive carefully considered protections under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
                                                                                                     
 168. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 169. Id. at 286. 
 170. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of Jones v. United States in a Surveillance Society: A 
Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2012) (“[A]ll 
three opinions in Jones made statements that call into question the Court’s ‘third party doctrine.’”). 
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V. EXPLORING THE SPD ALPR DATABASES 
The following section describes the nature of what is contained in the two 
databases disclosed by the SPD under state FOI law.  The first database (the “PIPS 
Database”) consists of ALPR cameras mounted on SPD patrol cars.  It is the larger 
of the two databases in terms of number of scans recorded, with over 1.5 million 
license plate scans recorded over a period of 87 days from January to April 2013.  
The second database (the “AutoVu Dabatase) contains fewer scans, at just over 
275,000 during a 77-day period from December 2012 to February 2013, but also 
includes photographs of the vehicles scanned (the PIPS database maintained by 
SPD does contain photos, but they were not disclosed in this case).  Each database 
contains un-redacted license plate numbers from the scanned vehicles, officer login 
IDs, timestamps, latitude and longitude of each scan, as well as other information 
about which scans resulted in hits. 
Because the databases overlap in time (from January 9 to February 15, 2013) 
they give a fairly accurate depiction of how the two systems were used and 
deployed during that time period.  Consistent with numbers reported by other 
agencies to the ACLU,171 these databases indicate that hits occurred only a fraction 
of the time (combined, at 1.2 percent of total scans).  Interestingly, the larger PIPS 
Database recorded a hit only 25 times every 10,000 scans.  The two systems have 
been incredibly active, scanning an average of 20,865 license plates every day over 
the represented time periods.  On January 9, 2013, one officer alone scanned over 
7,000 plates in a single shift.  Together, these mobile systems canvassed a large 
portion of the city, as represented in Figure 1, infra, although certain 
neighborhoods remained remarkably under-scanned in comparison. 
Tbl. 1 – Overview of both SPD databases. 
  
                                                                                                     
 171. See Crump, supra note 6, at 13. 
 172. This total excludes one removed line, which was filled with NULL in each column; other 
system reads not excluded, so this number may be a little high for actual license plate scans. 
Database SPD PIPS (patrol car) 
Database 
SPD AutoVu (parking 
enforcement) Database 
Totals 
Date range of scan 
data: 
01.09.2013 – 04.05.2013 12.01.2012 – 02.15.2013 - 
No. of days in 
database: 
87 77 - 
Total no. of scans: 1,501,547172 277,718 1,779,265 
Avg. scans per day: 17,259 3,606 20,865 
Total no. hits: 3,775 5,885 9,660 
Avg. hits per day: 43.4 76.4 119.8 
Percent of scans as 
hits: 
0.25% (less than 1%) 2.1% 1.2% 
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Not every scan returned accurate geolocation coordinates for the location the 
scan occurred, although most did (76.5 percent for PIPS; 99.9999 percent for 
AutoVu).  On average, the PIPS system also calculated an 87 percent confidence 
rate in the optical character interpretation, rising to 91 percent for scans resulting in 
hits.  Because each database contains information about individual officer logins 
(41 unique login IDs in the PIPS system; 91 in the AutoVu system), and many of 
these officers scan hundreds or thousands of cars in any given shift, the time and 























Fig. 1 – Mapped ALPR data from SPD ALPR Databases (cropped to include only 
Seattle city limits).  On the left, the larger PIPS database, from cameras mounted 
on SPD patrol cars.  On the right, the SPD AutoVu database, mounted on 
parking enforcement vehicles. 
 
  































Fig. 2 – Mapped ALPR data from SPD ALPR Databases (cropped to include 
only downtown Seattle).  On the top, the larger patrol car database.  On the 
bottom, the SPD parking enforcement database. 
Additionally, the databases indicate that multiple SPD officers scanned plates 
outside the Seattle city limits, and one scanned passing plates into the relatively 
distant cities of Snohomish, Port Orchard, and Fife.173  Other officers scanned 
plates in Burien, Washington, and onto Bainbridge Island (including scanning 
plates while on the ferry between Seattle and Bainbridge).  Because of the detailed 
                                                                                                     
 173. Another, larger ALPR database from an earlier period obtained by the ACLU of Washington 
State also includes scans outside of Washington State, when an officer scanned plates all the way into 
Portland, Oregon. 
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nature of the data, it is possible to calculate an officer’s rate of speed, determine 
which exits were taken and at what times.  This information has numerous uses to 
determine whether the systems are being used in appropriate ways, and raises a 
host of interesting questions related to privacy (of the officers and of innocent 














Fig. 3 – Number of ALPR scans on a daily basis from Dec. 1, 2012 to Feb. 15, 
2013, as contained in the SPD AutoVu Database.  Number of days with no scan 











Fig. 4 – Number of ALPR scans on a daily basis from Jan. 9, 2013 to Apr. 5, 
2013, as contained in the SPD PIPS Database.  Number of days with no scan 
data: 0. High: 30,186 scans on Mar. 15, 2013. 
Even a single day of data can lead to interesting exploratory findings and 
provide a glimpse of how the systems are utilized throughout the city.  Tables 2 and 
3, below, present scanning data from both databases on a single day, January 23, 
2013.  Figure 5, below, presents graphically the geographic coordinates of each 
scan created by two of the SPD patrol cars on the same date. 
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User/Login # Scans # Hits % Hits Scanning Time Hours Scans per 
hour 
A 6840 18 0.3% 6:23am – 4:11pm 9:48 698 









12:00am – 2:55am 





D 1687 5 0.3% 11:48am – 7:47pm 7:59 211.3 
E 848 0 0.0% 12:34pm – 6:49pm 6:15 135.7 
F 807 2 0.2% 8:32pm – 11:43pm 3:11* 253.5 
G 752 1 0.1% 12:25pm – 7:34pm 7:09 105.2 
H 428 6 1.4% 7:42pm – 11:56pm 4:14* 101.1 
I 221 0 0.0% 12:02am – 12:37am 0:35* 379.1 
J 152 0 0.0% 12:10am – 3:35am 3:25* 44.5 
K 128 0 0.0% 1:49am – 3:15am 2:26 * 52.7 
L 7 5 71.4% 8:49am – 1:13pm 4:24 1.6 
Totals 19484 55 0.28% - 62:47 310.3 
Total (all 
days in db) 
1,501,547 3773 0.25% - - - 
* Partial shift.  Additional scans take place prior to, or after,  
12:01am or 11:59pm on Jan. 23, 2013 
Tbl. 2 – Scan data for scans on January 23, 2013 (PIPS Database) 





99 1.9% 7:21am – 2:36pm 
4:42pm – 5:01pm 
8:25pm – 9:43pm 









45 0.8% 7:56am – 3:08pm 
4:47pm – 5:44pm 





Totals 10,871 144 1.3% - 21:54 496.4 
Total (all 
days in db) 
277,718 5,885 2.1% - - - 
* Partial shift.  Additional scans take place prior to, or after,  
12:01am or 11:59pm on Jan. 23, 2013 
Tbl. 3. – Scan data for scans on January 23, 2013 (AutoVu Database). 
  Broken out when breaks > an hour. 
 
  

















Fig. 5 – Scans on January 23, 2013 by individual scanning units.  From PIPS 
database.  User/Login (correlated to the randomized identifiers from Table 2, 
above) “I” on the right (n=221); “B” on the left (n=5757). 
VI. ALPR DATA AS PUBLIC RECORD 
Because information can provide and facilitate power, the collection and use of 
large amounts of information (including ALPR data) can significantly impact the 
relationships between governments and their citizens.174  Access to information 
about government activities is often a prerequisite to gaining and exercising power 
or seeking redress for potential rights violations stemming from secret activities of 
others.175  The openness of the SPD, evidenced by their willing disclosure of 
detailed ALPR databases stands in sharp contrast to states where statutes now 
restrict public access to this type of data, such as in Minnesota, Maine, Arkansas, 
Utah, and Vermont.  In these jurisdictions, this willingness to allow government 
surveillance (albeit with varying limitations) and limit citizens the rights of 
reciprocal surveillance, represents a potential imbalance in power between citizens 
and their governments.  This imbalance has the ability to tip the scales of power 
and limit the ability of the people to exercise democratic oversight and control 
those they have put in power to represent them.176   
As stated by the California Supreme Court, 
it has long been apparent that the desire for privacy must at many points give way 
before our right to know, and the news media's right to investigate and relate, facts 
about the events and individuals of our time.177 
                                                                                                     
 174. See CRAIG FORCESE AND AARON FREEMAN, THE LAWS OF GOVERNMENT: THE LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 481-84 (2005). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 474 (Cal. 1998). 
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Freedom of information (FOI) laws have provided a great deal of access to 
government records in recent years, and they serve as a powerful and effective 
means for empowering oversight by journalists and ordinary citizens.  In a very real 
sense, these laws provide a legal mechanism for citizen-initiated surveillance from 
underneath (sometimes termed “sousveillance”178 or the “participatory 
panopticon”179).  This form of reciprocal surveillance (which may take numerous 
forms, including public access to ALPR data generated by the state or local 
governments) grants citizens greater power to check government abuse and force 
even greater transparency.180  Edward Snowden’s decision to leak classified NSA 
intelligence documents to the press in 2013 certainly reinvigorated national and 
international critique of large-scale surveillance programs, but the controversies are 
not really all that new.  And they do not exist solely at the level of national 
intelligence.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
As government agencies and law enforcement departments increasingly adopt 
big-data surveillance technologies as part of their routine investigatory practice, 
personal information privacy concerns are the obvious jumping-off point for 
critique and media coverage.  However, law enforcement goals of more effective 
and efficient policing to keep our streets and communities safe are also weighty 
values that must be balanced against privacy concerns.  How to strike the right 
balance is, of course, a tricky question that will no doubt attract much scholarly ink 
in the years to come.  In the context of ALPR use, though, this paper advances a 
few normative claims. 
First, we must strike a balance between allowing large-scale ALPR 
deployment and the privacy rights of individual citizens.  Second, we must also 
strike a balance between personal privacy and granting access to government 
information, such as ALPR databases, since the disclosure of un-redacted license 
plate information (as well as enough geolocational coordinates) can be easily tied 
to an individual person, address, or place of business.  Public access to this data 
also risks officer privacy, and limiting access would eviscerate the public’s ability 
to conduct certain types of oversight made possible by access to detailed officer 
movements.  Despite all these competing interests, a few conclusions seem 
apparent, given the obvious biases expressed throughout this paper.  These 
conclusions do limit public access, but they do so to preserve the privacy rights of 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, & Barry Wellman, Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable 
Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 331 
(2003), available at http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3344/ 
3306; Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, The Generalized Sousveillance Society, 49 SOC. SCI. INFO. 489 (2011). 
 179. Jamais Cascio, The Rise of the Participatory Panopticon, WORLD CHANGING (May 4, 2005), 
http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/002651.html; Mark A. M. Kramer, Erika Reponen & Marianna 
Obrist, MobiMundi: Exploring the Impact of User-Generated Mobile Content—The Participatory 
Panopticon, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN COMPUTER 
INTERACTION WITH MOBILE DEVICES & SERVICES 575-77 (2008). 
 180. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); KEVIN D. HAGGARTY & RICHARD V. ERICSON, 
THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 10 (2007). 
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innocent citizens (and, as a consequence, also protect the privacy of individual 
police officers). 
As a first step, we ought to limit data retention on non-hit scans in a reasonable 
amount of time, as indicated by the BCIPC’s report to the VPD.  This would have 
two consequences: 1) it would protect the privacy of innocent citizens (those whose 
plates are not legitimately on any law enforcement hotlist) by limiting the ability of 
the police to conduct after-the-fact analysis of these individuals’ historical 
movements and, 2) it would limit the ability of anyone to track an officer’s precise 
movements with such great accuracy.  There are two potential options for this 
solution: either we require non-hot data to be purged from the database within a 
reasonable amount of time (in British Columbia, for example, VPD is required to 
redact this information at the end of every shift, prior to sharing data with the 
RCMP) or we require the anonymization of non-hit entries in the database (e.g., 
redacting or randomly altering license plate numbers from the data).   
Due to fears of re-identification, we might promote the first option: complete 
redaction.  This option preserves the privacy of innocent motorists as well as the 
individual officers.  On the other hand, this option also significantly limits the 
citizens’ ability to monitor officer use of these systems as only a small fraction of 
the overall scans would remain, giving a much less accurate picture of policing 
patterns.  The second option would maintain a larger corpus of data, for use both by 
citizens and the police departments themselves, facilitating data-driven and 
predictive policing efforts as well as citizen oversight, but does so at the risk of re-
identification.  For present purposes, without a more detailed analysis of the re-
identification risks involved, either of these options represents a drastic 
improvement in general practice, especially as these practices are exhibited in the 
Minneapolis and Seattle cases. 
As a second, and absolutely necessary, step, such anonymized ALPR data 
should not be exempted from public disclosure.  This normative claim supports 
vital interests in government transparency, regardless of whether we opt for 
redaction or anonynmization.  This policy would allow some oversight through 
public disclosure, and would allow the public to conduct an informed debate about 
the efficacy and cost of the use of these systems in their communities. 
This conclusion, bifurcated into two potential options, admittedly does not 
answer the final balancing question completely. Option one does more to protect 
privacy than it does to force a right to reciprocal surveillance, and the second 
option preserves this right at the risk of re-identification.  Neither is therefore 
perfect, but both are better than what generally exists at present.  Importantly, there 
are strong reasons to push back against the trend to pull a curtain of secrecy over 
ALPR data all together.  This privacy-weighted conclusion is warranted, to some 
degree, by the importance of recognizing greater rights of privacy in public spaces, 
especially when it concerns subsequent aggregation and data-mining of otherwise 
innocent peoples’ personal information.  Modern surveillance technologies make it 
incredibly easy for government agents to track individual citizens discretely and 
comprehensively for very long periods of time.  Court decisions finding that 
citizens do not maintain legitimate expectations of privacy in their public 
movements and strict application of the third-party doctrine to aggregated forms of 
government information gathering need to be rethought and critically examined in 
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light of modern technological advances. The unrestricted ability of law 
enforcement to engage in mass amounts of geolocational surveillance that captures 
the personal information of innocent individuals, including the use of ALPR, 
threatens individual privacy and bypasses traditional checks on abusive 
government actions. The nature and amount of data available about most people’s 
movements—both present and long into the recent past—allows law enforcement 
to draw inferences about other personal information, and should be subject to the 
probable cause warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  The mosaic theory 
provides one useful lens and framework for analyzing these sorts of cases.  It also 
“protects the Fourth Amendment from innocuous erosion by society‘s ready 
adoption of such technology” even as governmental “use of GPS devices becomes 
a social norm.”181 
On the other hand, advancing technologies and data-mining potentially offer 
law enforcement greater ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute criminal 
activity.  These concerns for personal information privacy and the efficacy of law 
enforcement are both very important in contemporary society.  The tensions 
between these two legitimate aims is substantial and, in the context of police use of 
automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems, limiting the scope of law 
enforcement data retention to protect citizen privacy might also protect the privacy 
of the police officers using these systems. Thus, we can serve the interests behind 
FOI laws, including the implicated First Amendment rights to gather information 
about government conduct, and personal privacy rights by limiting long-term 
retention and the sharing of any non-hit license plate information with other 
agencies or private companies.  The recent practice of the Seattle Police 
Department demonstrates an applaudable commitment to transparency and, 
combined with more limited data retention, as described above, would provide a 
compelling example for managing the risks and benefits of ALPR use. 
  
                                                                                                     
 181. Dickman, supra note 158, at 738. 
